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Question 
 What are the lessons learned from development programmes that managed to transition 




2. Key lessons from transboundary water (TBW) and other infrastructure projects 
3. Factors that may hinder or facilitate transition to sustainable funding model 







Often, the investments made, and funds committed to the water sector fall short of actual 
financing needs. These financial inadequacies are particularly prevalent in the field of 
transboundary water (TBW) development initiatives.1 While 60% of all freshwater flow worldwide 
occurs in transboundary basins and transboundary aquifers are of vital, yet insufficiently 
understood importance, funding for TBW is even more limited than funding for the water sector. 
Most international public financing is diverted into the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) 
sector and most private capital flows into large infrastructure projects at the national level. 
Transboundary water development initiatives that do not directly relate to investment 
opportunities in infrastructure face difficulties of attracting investment. The deficiency of 
commitment of states to allocate scarce financial resources to TBW development is also an 
obstacle (Raadgever, 2015; UNECE, 2018). Consequently, transboundary water resources are 
not sufficiently developed and managed. This has led to wasted opportunities for cooperation 
that could provide benefits to riparian populations and countries. Sometimes, it could even lead 
to disagreements and conflicts between riparian states over shared resources, ultimately creating 
additional costs and losses. (INBO and GWP, 2012; GWH, 2017a; Raadgever, 2015; UNECE, 
2018) 
Notwithstanding the importance of the topic, academic and policy-oriented analyses have thus 
far mostly neglected the question of financing transboundary water development projects and 
cooperation. The few existing studies usually have a narrow scope and focus on particular 
financial necessities or financing mechanisms: either with an emphasis on development 
cooperation (e.g. GIZ 2007; EUWI 2013); or on international private investments and often only 
cover one basin or region (e.g. SADC, 2010). Conversely, in recent years, the funding of 
transboundary water management is being realized more and more through the financing of 
climate change adaptation (World Bank 2018).   
Owing to the lack of academic literature, this report mainly relies on grey literature and various 
reports issued by development agencies that implement programmes. Further, the list of sample 
projects reviewed in Section 2 (i.e. to draw lessons) mostly include non-transboundary water 
infrastructure projects. This is because of the difficulty of identifying such specific infrastructure 
projects with funding extensions (or other relevant financial innovations) in the limited amount of 
time available to prepare this report. Thus, the report tries to complement the limited availability 
of exemplar transboundary water projects in Section 2 (i.e. projects with history of a transition in 
their financing models) with a generic discussion of sustainable financing models and sources of 
financing in Section 4. 
Key highlights: 
 The Mara River Basin Management Project in East Africa was launched in 2006 
through funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. Later, it took advantage of funding 
from the World Bank - Nile Basin Initiative Trust Fund, the Nile Cooperation for Results 
and Cooperation in International Waters. 
                                                   
1 Transboundary waters, according to (UNECE, 2018), refers to rivers, lakes and aquifers. 
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o Mobilizing resources for implementation of the identified investment opportunities 
was a major challenge for the project. Lack of political goodwill and commitment 
from partners also posed difficulties. 
o Despite problems, the project had shown high potential for sustainability. This 
was helped by institutionalization and strategies of lobbying for political goodwill 
as well as efforts of packaging projects into proposals to raise funding. 
 The Private Infrastructure Development Group was launched in 2012 through 
financing from DFID and other donors. 
o The programme has faced some financing challenges due to the departure of 
several donors. The funding problem had led to a rising share of DFID’s funding 
and an additional funding from some donors such as Switzerland and Australia. 
o The approval of a new five-year Strategy shows that the program will have some 
sustainability. However, realizing long-term financial self-sustainability requires 
further work. 
 The Regional Infrastructure Programme for Africa was launched in 2012 and involved 
DFID and other partners and funds such as the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, and 
NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (IPPF). 
o The project has failed to attract additional funding (at the rate initially forecasted) 
for some of its output components – due to persistent management and staffing 
challenges. 
o Infrastructure continues to be a key constraint and sustainability cannot be easily 
guaranteed. It may also take many years to better assess the benefits of the 
programme. 
 The India Infrastructure Loan Fund was launched in 2013 through DFID funding and 
together with its local partner - the Infrastructure Development Finance Company. 
o The project has faced challenges in presenting bankable projects due to changes 
in priorities, especially by the local partner. There are also risks linked to fraud 
and corruption as well as that some projects may not be pro-poor. 
o The project also faces risks of loss of DFID money and early closure. 
o However, institutionalization of the program has been its strength and may 
ensure the sustainability of the programme. 
2. Key lessons from transboundary water (TBW) and other 
infrastructure projects   
 Case 1: Mara River Basin Management Project 
Brief programme summary: (MRBMP Project Report, 2015 & MRBMP Final Evaluation Report, 
2013) 
 Full title: Mara River Basin Management Project (MRBMP) 
 Donors and partners: Sweden, World Bank, Kenya and Tanzania 
 Initial Funding:  
o The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) funded the initial 
project preparatory phase (2006-2010) with US$3.3 Million.  
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o The World Bank-Nile Basin Initiative Trust Fund (NBTF) has funded project 
preparatory studies with US$ 2.049million. This raised the total project budget to 
US$5.434 million.  
 Extra Funding: 
o Sida and NORAD have funded the bridging phase (2010-2012) at US$ 1,755.806  
o Phase II of bridging Phase funded by Sweden (2013-2014) at US$ 2,346,194 
million.  
o Nile Cooperation for Results (NCORE)/Cooperation in International Waters 
(CIWA) funded the project over the Jan 2015-June 2017 period at US$ 605,660 
 Start/Closing Date: 
o Phase I: Jan 2006 to March 2010;  
o World Bank-NBTF Supplemental Financing (Bridging Phase): April 2010-March 
2012  
o Phase II (of Bridging phase): 2013-2014 
Programme details: (MRBMP Project Report, 2015 & MRBMP Final Evaluation Report, 2013) 
 The overall objective of the project was to setup a sustainable cooperative framework for 
the joint management of the water resources of the Mara River Basin in order to prepare 
for sustainable development investments that will improve the living conditions of the 
people while protecting the environment. 
 The Mara river basin is among the most important river basins in East Africa as it 
traverses the world-famous Maasai Mara Serengeti ecosystem recently declared one of 
the new seven natural wonders of the World. In spite of this global and regional 
significance, the river remains threatened by destruction of forest cover, unsustainable 
farming practices, high population growth rate and climate change. Accordingly, the 
seasonal water quantities have changed significantly in the sense that there are now 
higher peaks and lows in the river flows. Consequently, floods have become more 
common and large parts of the Tanzanian Mara wetlands have become more permanent 
instead of temporary wetlands. These issues require a whole of basin approach to their 
management.  
 Recognizing these threats, the project is preparing several investment proposals in the 
fields of water infrastructure, watershed management and irrigation infrastructure for 
subsequent funding within a consistent basin development strategy. 
 The project addresses the following medium- and long-term objectives;  
I) Improved water resources development through development multipurpose 
storage reservoirs for Irrigation, water supplies and Small hydroelectric power 
II) Improved River Basin Management through Integrated Watershed 
Management Projects (Environmental Integrity/Alternative Livelihoods). 
Key achievements: (MRBMP Project Report, 2015) 
 The Mara River Basin Project contributes to improved living conditions of the basin 
communities by facilitating an enabling environment for sustainable development-
oriented investments and building capacity of riparian staff and communities in integrated 
water resources management and development. 




o Land and Water Management (US$ 11.4m) – interventions with emphasis on 
improved land  
o Livelihoods Diversification (US$ 39.7m) – interventions with potential to improve 
incomes and thus livelihoods 
o Watershed Management Project (US$ 21,612m)  
o Sustainable Wetlands Management Project (US$ 7,134m)  
o Water Pollution and Sanitation Project (US$ 4,461m)  
o Cross-cutting activities (US$ 2,313m) 
Challenges/Risks noted: (MRBMP Project Report, 2015 & MRBMP Final Evaluation Report, 
2013) 
 Main challenge: Mobilizing resources for implementation of the identified investment 
opportunities 
 Other challenges: slow processes in reforming the water sectors; low commitment and 
political goodwill by key partners (e.g. government departments) and lack of financial 
capacities of local Water Resources Management (WRM) institutions to for self-sustainability. 
 Key areas of failure were:  
o Lack of dissemination of lessons learnt from the documentation mainly in Tanzania  
o Failure to guarantee that Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA) took full 
responsibility for the water resources monitoring data  
o Involvement of stakeholders from the private sector was weak 
 Lessons learnt: i) Political good is key for the success of the projects; ii) Adequate time for 
community engagement is required 
Program Sustainability: (MRBMP Project Report, 2015 & MRBMP Final Evaluation Report, 
2013) 
 The activities initiated by the project have high potential for sustainability given the extent of 
institutionalization through Water Resources Users’ Associations (WRUAs)/Water Users’ 
Associations (WUAs). These institutions can mobilize resources internally through 
registration and subscription, from WSTF in Kenya and civil society organizations such as 
Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF) and regional programs such as the Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI). The private sector although not well mainstreamed by the project but is also 
another potential area from where resources can be mobilised to sustain and upscale the 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). IWRM processes. In Kenya, WRMA has 
developed a concept to incorporate livelihoods within the SCMPs as a means of promoting 
WRUA participation and consequently sustaining IWRM processes. The issue of livelihood is 
a noble idea which although was scaled down by the project but offers potential for 
sustainability of IWRM processes 
 Strategy to sustain the gains: i) Lobby for political good will for projects ownership ii) Lobby 
National governments and local governments/Counties to pick some prepared projects for 
implementation. iii) Package prepared projects into proposals for mobilizing finances for 
implementation 
 
Case 2: Private Infrastructure Development Group 
Brief programme summary: (PIDG Business Case, 2015 & Project Completion Review, 2018) 
 Full title: Core support to the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) 
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 Initial Programme Value at commencement (business case): £477m 
 Final Programme Value (full life): £524,246,994 
 Start Date Feb 2012 & End Date (final): March 2018 
 Programme Code: 203232-101 
 DevTracker link to business case: http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/3716864.odt 
Programme details: (PIDG Business Case, 2015) 
 In 2002, the UK Government, with other donors, established the Private Infrastructure 
Development Group (PIDG) to encourage and mobilise private sector investment into 
infrastructure in the frontier markets of Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia.   
 PIDG consists of many separate facilities or companies that all support private investment 
in infrastructure and seek to tackle different gaps throughout the project development 
cycle.  For example, the weak enabling environment, the lack of early stage project 
development, the lack of affordable debt finance and an absence of local currency loans, 
or risk guarantees to support currency lenders finance private sector investment in 
infrastructure. 
 To address these issues, PIDG’s early stage facilities, InfraCo Africa and InfraCo Asia, 
developed “greenfield” projects or help restructure or co-finance existing projects that may 
be stranded.  In both cases they take projects to financial close, and in some cases through 
to operation, to prove that the projects are viable before they exit the deal and reinvest in 
their project pipelines.   
 PIDG Facilities can access PIDG’s Technical Advisory Facility (TAF) funding to make sure 
the projects they implement are affordable and commercially viable.  PIDG’s debt arm, the 
Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF) and its local guarantee vehicle (GuarantCo) 
play an important role in mobilising private finance from international and domestic 
markets, which not only helps deliver vital infrastructure in frontier markets but also assists 
in developing the local banking sector and alleviates the pressure facing countries’ balance 
sheets if they had to support the financing of these projects themselves. 
 Initial support to PIDG was relatively small, growing gradually as additional facilities were 
added.  However, in 2011 DFID decided to significantly scale up its support through a new 
business case - making funding of £477 million available, between March 2012 and March 
2015.  It made a further £223 million available under a performance-based contestability 
mechanism.  DFID also committed £73 million to a new PIDG facility, Green Africa Power.  
The period of the business case was subsequently extended through two extensions to 
March 2018. 
Key achievements: (PIDG Project Completion Review, 2018) 
 Over the period 2012-2018, the PIDG facilities have largely met or exceeded their targets, 
continually leveraging private sector finance and know how to deliver infrastructure projects 
in challenging markets. 
 By using small amounts of donor capital, PIDG has been able to mobilise and increase 
substantial flows of local and investor capital, lending and expertise.  To date, for every $1 
of donor funds PIDG has helped mobilise $17 of private local and foreign commercial 
financing ($23 including Development Finance Institutions DFIs). 
 Based on DFID’s positive assessment of PIDG’s performance, the significant 
strengthening in PIDG’s overall governance, and an independent review commissioned by 
DFID of PIDG’s niche, that confirmed its unique role compared with other entities such as 
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CDC and the IFC, DFID Ministers approved a new Business Case, providing a further 
tranche of funding to PIDG covering March 2018 – March 2022 of up to £435 million and 
a contingent liability (“Callable Capital”) of £90 million. 
Challenges/Risks noted: (PIDG Project Completion Review, 2018) 
 Over the period of the business case, PIDG’s membership changed and several donors 
decided to leave the organisation.  Many of the remaining donors also faced funding 
challenges which meant that DFID’s proportion of PIDG’s overall funding increased 
significantly, and the UK provided almost three-quarters of the funding.   
 DFID funding has, however, continued to crowd in other like-minded donors as well, with 
Switzerland and Australia contributing further contributions to PIDG, and recently DGIS on 
behalf of the Netherlands is considering new funding as well.    
Program Sustainability: (PIDG Project Completion Review, 2018) 
 The completion and approval by donors of a new five-year Strategy for PIDG ensures 
that the programme remains at the frontier but also delivers greater transformational 
impact, and a degree of self-sustainability. 
 GuarantCo (which is  the local guarantee vehicle for PIDG’s debt arm, i.e. the Emerging 
Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF))2 is on the way to financial sustainability and has recorded 
a profit in 2017 (of US$8.2m – largely due to reversal of provisions following successful 
restructure of a project, as well as fair value gains). This is against losses recorded in 
previous years. However, profits may reduce in the coming years (or lead to losses again) 
as a result of the impact of new accounting rules). Hence, GuarantCo still needs to work 
towards ensuring long-term financial self-sustainability. 
 
Case 3: Regional Infrastructure Programme 
Brief programme summary: (RIPA Business Case, 2012 & Project Completion Review, 2017)  
 Full title: Regional Infrastructure Programme for Africa (RIPA) 
 Initial Programme Value at commencement (business case): £39.25 million 
 Final Programme Value (full life): £66.72 million   
 Start Date Nov. 2012 & End Date (final)3: Dec. 2016 
 Programme Code: 202579 
 DevTracker link to business case: http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-
202579/documents/ 
Programme details: (RIPA Business Case, 2012) 
 The Regional Infrastructure Programme for Africa (RIPA) was designed in 2012 to 
enhance economic growth and trade flows in sub-Saharan Africa, by strengthening the 
preparation of regional infrastructure projects and the availability of investment financing 
for their implementation.  
                                                   
2 The Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF) and its local guarantee vehicle (GuarantCo) play an important 
role in mobilising private finance from international and domestic markets, which not only helps deliver vital 
infrastructure in frontier markets but also assists in developing the local banking sector and alleviates the 
pressure facing countries’ balance sheets if they had to support the financing of these projects themselves. 
(PIDG Project Completion Review, 2018) 
3 Amendments/extensions: on November 2013, an additional £40 million to the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust 
Fund (ITF) was approved, bringing total programme budget to £79.25 million. At the same time, the programme 
end date was extended to 2016. 
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 RIPA aimed to address some of the binding constraints for regional infrastructure in 
Africa. These include technical capacity, the high cost (and risk) of project preparation, 
linkages between governments and financiers, the availability of financing to meet the 
needs of a project, and coordination between multilateral organisations. RIPA’s goals are 
directly aligned with the African Union’s Programme for Infrastructure Development in 
Africa (PIDA) and the priorities contained in its Priority Action Plan (PAP).  
 RIPA brought together, in a single programme, DFID support for several activities that 
were previously funded through separate projects, each of which had a unique role in 
relation to regional infrastructure.  
 The programme consisted of four complementary components: 
o £15m to the NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (IPPF), which 
commissions early-stage preparation of regional projects;  
o £2m to the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) to strengthen regional 
coordination and monitoring of infrastructure investment in Africa;  
o £60m to the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF) to help development 
finance institutions to fund the implementation (and later stage project 
preparation) of regional projects  
o £2m to fund up to five DFID secondments to multilateral organisations – the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), African Development Bank (AfDB) and World 
Bank – to augment their capacity and strengthen their coordination on regional 
infrastructure. 
 A central motive for this programmatic approach was to exploit synergies between the 
different initiatives and increase linkages with DFID’s sub-regional programmes that 
sought to boost intra-Africa trade along the main transport corridors in East and Southern 
Africa.4 By bringing these interventions into one programme, RIPA could deliver a greater 
impact than the sum of its parts.  
Key achievements: (RIPA Project Completion Review, 2017) 
 Since the start of RIPA, the ITF has approved 12 technical assistance grants and five 
investment grants for regional infrastructure projects.5 Some of the highlights include: 
o €13m for the Rusumo Falls Hydropower Project, which will increase cross-border 
power supply to Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. 
o €2m for the Interconnection of the Electric Grids of Nile Equatorial Lakes 
Countries, which involves construction of 946 km transmission lines and 17 
associated substations in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, 
Rwanda and Uganda, leading to lower electricity costs and greater access to 
electricity in those countries. 
o €20m for the Kagitumba-Kyonzo-Rusumo Road Rehabilitation Project, which will 
rehabilitate 208km of this regional priority road connecting Rwanda with Uganda 
and Tanzania. The project includes improvements to road safety and the 
construction of two cross-border markets.6 
                                                   
4 Trade Mark East Africa (TMEA) and Trade Mark Southern Africa (TMSA)  
5 Excludes grants under the SE4All window and cancelled grants.  




 Since the scale-up of DFID’s contribution to the ITF in 2013, €111m of grants have been 
approved under the Regional Envelope, leveraging more than €2b of additional financing 
for regional infrastructure (a leverage ratio of 1: 18.3). 
 DFID played an important role in incorporating the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) 
window into the ITF. DFID’s influence led to the maintenance of a separate window for 
regional projects, as well as non-EU members being allowed to remain in the Project 
Financier’s Group. DFID also helped ensure that lessons from the ITF informed the 
design of a new European blending instrument, the Africa Investment Facility (AfIF).  
 DFID’s role in the IPPF Oversight Committee was instrumental in ensuring a joint donor 
approach to the Facility’s performance issues, which resulted in improved management 
oversight, staffing and reporting standards. During the RIPA programme, the IPPF 
approved 24 regional project preparation grants and took 11 projects to financial close for 
implementation. 
 DFID helped extend the ICA, initially a G8 initiative, to all of the G20. DFID was heavily 
involved in the ICA’s Strategic Business Plans and helped to maintain a focus on project 
preparation. 
 DFID secondees contributed to many important initiatives at the World Bank, EIB and 
AfDB. RIPA’s programmatic approach to secondments – which enabled some level of 
coordination between secondees – was reported to be better than DFID’s previous ad 
hoc approach. 
Challenges/Risks noted: (RIPA Project Completion Review, 2017) 
 It is difficult to assess the benefits of interventions, given the time lag involved in 
infrastructure projects to convert inputs to outputs/outcomes and eventual impacts and the 
challenge of attribution. Therefore, it may take several years to know whether RIPA has 
delivered the full returns expected in the business case.  
 For the IPPF, DFID’s financing was expected to lead to more projects receiving preparation 
grants. It was forecast that every £1 of project preparation expenditure from the IPPF would 
lead to £20 of additional funding from financiers in the implementation stage.  Even with 
the reduced DFID contribution to the IPPF, the persistent management and staffing 
challenges have meant this conversion rate from preparation to investment may not have 
been fully achieved.  
 The programme risk of funds not being used as intended is minor, as the funds are 
disbursed through known mechanisms in reliable host institutions.   
Program Sustainability: (RIPA Project Completion Review, 2017) 
 At the end of the programme, regional infrastructure remains a serious constraint to 
economic growth in Africa and there is no obvious, sustainable institution in place to 
continue to address the challenge of navigating projects through to implementation. 
 
Case 4: India Infrastructure Loan Fund 
Brief programme summary: (IILF Business Case, 2017 & Annual Review, 2018)  
 Full title: India Infrastructure Loan Fund (IILF) 
 Initial Programme Value at commencement (business case): Up to £38 million 
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 Final Programme Value (full life - expected): £38 million (original budget) plus at least 
£120 million (private investment) 
 Start Date Oct. 2013 & End Date (final): May 2023 
 Programme Code: 202869 
 DevTracker link to business case: http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/4002506.doc 
Programme details: (IILF Business Case, 2017) 
 The programme was approved to deploy up to £38m under two components. Specifically, 
£36 million towards a concessional line of credit to Infrastructure Development Finance 
Company (IDFC Ltd)7 to deliver early stage, long-term debt to pro-poor infrastructure 
projects in the low-income states, in turn attracting other lenders and investors. This will 
be in sectors such as:  
o Clean Energy: Biomass, Solar, Wind, Hydro, Waste to Energy;  
o Agri Infrastructure: Grain warehouses, cold-storage chains, irrigation 
infrastructure, etc;  
o Roads and transport: state, district roads, transport (e.g tractors, cold storage 
trucks);  
o Urban Infrastructure: Solid waste management, wastewater etc. 
o Social infrastructure: healthcare (e.g. hospitals) and education infrastructure 
 £2 million to buy expertise that helps improve the design of infrastructure projects; improve 
the quality of environmental, social and governance standards applied by IDFC to 
investment proposals; conduct monitoring and evaluations that generate knowledge about 
what works best; and disseminate this to other investors and infrastructure companies.  
 The programme guarantees complementarity with DFID HQ programmes: CDC and 
PIDG (InfraCo Asia, GuarantCo, DevCo, TAF etc.) and through multi-laterals (World 
Bank, IFC, AsDB) and bilateral agencies which are active in India’s infrastructure 
development. These agencies typically operate (a) on a pan-India basis unlike DFID’s 
focus on the eight poorest states (b) with large investments in more mature infrastructure 
sub-sectors (e.g. telecommunications, national highways) (c) with typically larger funding 
amounts per investment (from £10m to £100m+) and (d) with either concessional or tied 
funding on sovereign lending (e.g. $5-bn Japanese investment in Delhi-Mumbai corridor) 
and (e) with more established industry players in the non-sovereign category.  
 
Key achievements: (IILF Annual Review, 2018) 
 The programme is expected to directly result in: 
o At least 12 new private sector-led projects, at least £120 million of private 
investment mobilised   
o An estimated 280 000 people get access to new/improved infrastructure services 
such as electricity, sewerage, and transport 
o An estimated 1500 long term jobs / 3000 short term jobs generated directly  
 Two projects have reached financial closure and two others are on-track at advanced 
stages within IDFC (expected to reach financial closure soon).  
                                                   
7 IDFC Ltd. has transitioned into a Bank on 1st October 2015. The required formalities, in line with similar 
arrangements that IDFC Ltd followed with other lenders, were completed by DFID timely and in consultation with 
FCPD. IDFC Bank does have a broader mandate on small loans to infrastructure projects which augers well with 
the mandate of the loan fund programme. (IILF Annual Review, 2018) 
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 Well-diversified across states and sectors: The sector split for the £22.75m anticipated 
approved spend is 45% in clean energy, 33% in road and transport and 22% in agri-
infra/allied: 
 There are clear positive signs supporting the value for money proposition in the BC. As it 
is early to evaluate the performance formally, the following measures were agreed to 
improve VFM: 
 Leveraging private funds as much as possible: DFID provides line of credit to propsoals 
where IDFC is also investing (e.g. for the one investment this is £15m of IDFC’s against 
DFID’s £4m. The promoter has brought in £6.3m).  
 Alignment facility with vis-à-vis local market: IDFC is using the line of credit to on lend to 
projects and will return the capital to DFID on pre agreed terms. Allowing IDFC to reuse 
funds within the overall timeframe multiplies development impact per £, e.g. current and 
term lending. 
DFID and IDFC have worked closely to look at the commercial and development aspects 
of projects. They have looked at ways in which we can most effectively target DFID’s 
funding to groups that were most deserving such as for the project in the transport sector, 
DFID suggested the target group include women, people with disability, youth from poorer 
background e.g. SC/ST or minorities. 
Challenges/Risks noted: (IILF Annual Review, 2018) 
 Lack of pipeline for bankable projects due to i) Changing priorities and focus due to 
IDFC’s transition into Bank and ii) delays in execution of existing projects. To mitigate 
this, 
o DFID has decided to facilitate deal flow with state governments including through 
existing DFID TA programmes 
o Close working with Partner on pipeline e.g.  adding sub partners “conduits” 
o Review of investment policy to expand pro-poor sectors 
 There are some challenges linked to Fraud & Corruption Risk. In this regard, DFID’s 
assessment of due diligence confirmed IDFC’s Corporate Governance (e.g. audits, 
DFID’s ACCF and mitigation) as strong. Contractual documents also emphasise DFID’s 
policy on fraud and corruption. 
 There is a development risk - as investments fail to have pro-poor impact. DFID’s 
mitigation measures include enforcing contractual obligations to focus on development 
outcomes and joint decision making on investments. 
 Other risks include; 
o Loss of DFID money (DFID measure: legal obligation on partner to bear credit 
risk (AAA rated) and fully hedging of currency risk) 
o Early closure of project due to underperformance (DFID measure: direct support 
to Partner; scenarios /options with pros/cons developed) 
o Policy environment restricts implementation of projects (DFID measure: DFID 
Technical Assistance to improve investment climate to the extent possible, e.g. 
Jharkhand roads sector) 
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o Reputational risk related to investments (DFID measure: Legally binding loan 
agreement; joint decisions on investments; Due Diligence on IDFC’s systems e.g. 
environmental, social and governance (ESG)) 
 Lessons learnt: Through investments in pro-poor sectors in India and working with our 
partners, the programme aims to catalyse capital into the low-income states. key learning 
in the review period (i.e. as of 2018) were:  
o Understanding the need within target sectors and how effectively a facility can 
respond with patient capital vis-à-vis market as being important for development 
capital investment programmes. DCI programmes, especially those supporting 
small infrastructure projects, require significant time, effort and flexibility to marry 
the development criteria with the commercial, to ensure value for money.  
o Embedding the programme and getting ownership of the team within IDFC 
ensured that the strengths of the entire institution were mobilised. 
Institutionalisation of project initiatives and ethos at various levels of the 
organisation ensures sustainability as the programme transitions from primarily 
focus on project investments to portfolio monitoring by the next annual review. 
Program Sustainability: (IILF Annual Review, 2018) 
 Embedding the programme and getting ownership of the team within IDFC ensured that 
the strengths of the entire institution were mobilised. Institutionalisation of project 
initiatives and ethos at various levels of the organisation ensures sustainability as the 
programme transitions from primarily focus on project investments to portfolio monitoring 
by the next annual review. 
3. Factors that may hinder or facilitate transition to 
sustainable funding model 
Risks that hinder transitions to an alternative and sustainable funding model 
Investing in water services through bankable projects entails the provision of enabling finance 
facilities (such as grants; credits; risk guarantees; matching funds). However, the preparation of 
solid bankable projects is costly and time consuming in a developing country context due to 
political, technical, environmental, financial and social risks. These project preparations and 
subsequent due diligence make private sector hesitant to engage in water related projects at the 
transboundary and national levels. Donors can therefore play a major role in preparing a pipeline 
of solid regional projects for subsequent due diligence by different financiers (public and private). 
(EUWI and SIWI, 2010)  
limited national budgets and inability to anticipate actual cost recovery levels (pricing), taxes and 
charges by regions (specifically in slower growing regions with poor governance structures) are 
some of the key structural blockages that negatively impact on the private sectors’ appetite for 
engagement. (Escribano et al., 2010) 
 
Donors can play a role in mitigating structural blockages that limit access to private sector capital 
and local sources of finances (as a result of ineffective cost recovery mechanisms) e.g. through 
the output-based aid approach. The limited capacity of bilateral donors to identify bankable projects 
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and engage with what is perceived as complex financial transactions, limits their willingness to 
engage in these activities. Significant opportunities exist for donors to engage in transaction 
advisory services on specific investment projects. (EUWI and SIWI, 2010) 
While donor involvement in all activities adds political weight and capacity to the formulation of 
joint objectives and projects, ironically the reputational risk to the bilateral donors’ increases as 
they focus on service delivery. Service delivery is key to meeting the development targets and 
donors can not only focus on the governance or the water information aspects when supporting 
transboundary waters transformation. Risks increase as donors engage on projects with service 
delivery as the Bujagali HEP in Uganda illustrated, where financial closure was delayed by 
several years due to minor corruption and bilateral disbanding. (EUWI and SIWI, 2010) 
In the transboundary context, it is necessary to structure the operational and financial 
mechanisms across political and geographical boundaries, requiring further donor support to 
facilitate investment from different sources. At the same time the absence of good industry 
standards for financing different sets of key water activities on both a transboundary and national 
scale brings unclear incentives for private sector investors. This is further compounded by lack of 
international taxation regimes for TBW projects. Amongst water services related activities water 
for energy seems to be able to attract most financing today. The public sector-oriented aspects of 
delivering multipurpose storage or ecosystem services is not as easy to finance partly due to 
unclear revenue streams. (EUWI and SIWI, 2010) 
Private financiers require donors and IFIs to share the risks including political, regulatory and 
sub-sovereign. The split between private and public (including international public) sources 
depends on the proper identification of public (national and international) goods, and goods and 
services that can be marketed. For TBW projects there is an increased political risk that most 
private investors would be reluctant to accept. The donor community can help by covering this 
risk. At the same time the donor community is risk averse when it comes to reputational risks that 
can be associated with major transboundary water development projects and storage schemes. 
(EUWI and SIWI, 2010) 
Factors and actions that facilitate the transition to sustainable funding models 
Appropriate project finance structures are required that balance, for example, grants and loans, 
with risk sharing and guarantees. IFIs have been reactive and developed several innovative 
mechanisms to address these concerns (e.g. the Private Investment Development Group’s 
(PIDG)8, Guarantco9, providing guarantees as credit enhancement of local currency debt, the 
World Bank Group’s MIGA providing political risk insurance and investment guarantees, and 
Swedfund10). There are opportunities to consider how these instruments can be used for TBW 
development activities in general (soft investment) and regional water infrastructure investments 
in particular (hard investment).  
Guarantee schemes give investors comfort that their projected cash flow will not be disrupted by 
events beyond their control, or if they are that the costs of disruption will be partially or wholly 
offset by a guarantee. Fundamental to this formula is that the underlying cash flow of the project 
is sufficient to attract and retain their interest (i.e. some minimum guaranteed level of cost 
                                                   





recovery). To stimulate greater investment flows to the sector, a supply of bankable projects is 
needed. (EUWI and SIWI, 2010) 
While guarantee instruments have achieved some success in providing risk mitigation for 
investments in infrastructure projects in power, telecom and transport, these instruments have 
been used only rarely in the water sector. This underscores the specific nature of risks affecting 
investments in water activities (in particular cost recovery issues). Donors can play a role in 
mitigating these risks, either through supporting existing IFI mechanisms e.g. with marketing 
efforts; modifying existing schemes to fit transboundary initiatives; or through directly establishing 
member state funds. (OECD, 2009) 
4. Sustainable funding models for TBW infrastructure 
projects 
An important aspect for ensuring sustainable transboundary basin development is funding. The 
scarcity of sustainable funding models however often prevents countries from developing TBW 
resources. Many countries also face problems in financing transboundary water development 
projects from national financial sources because the benefits of TBW development projects are 
not always known and funding is usually targeted to national and local water projects. 
Sustainable funding models for transboundary basin development are therefore crucial. (UN, 
2019) 
International financial resources (beyond discrete bilateral ODA)    
International financial resources usually help finance transboundary water projects. These 
sources can be alternatives or complements for domestic resources (which are inadequate to 
meet financing needs in many regions) – either due to actual financial capacity gaps in the 
corresponding countries or due to the low importance rendered to transboundary water 
resources development. 
While there are many ways to classify the diverse financing sources, the background document 
prepared for the “High-Level Workshop on Financing Transboundary Basin Development” (held 
in Astana, Kazakhstan on 9 October 2018) lists the key international/external sources as: donor 
financing through development cooperation; international financial institutions (IFIs); and 
international climate funds (UNECE, 2018).  
Development cooperation and donor financing (pooling multiple donor resources) 
Transboundary water development has been facing considerable domestic financing difficulties. 
Yet, it has been (more and more) promoted by the international community as the way to handle 
the challenges that arise from the transboundary character of many of the world’s water 
resources (in the framework of the paradigm shift towards integrated water resources 
management (IWRM)). Accordingly, the international donor community has progressively 
engaged in financing cooperation efforts in the developing world.  (INBO and GWP, 2012; EUWI, 
2013) 




 Some basins have garnered considerable financial support from several donors (e.g. the 
Nile River Basin, which in 2011 was funded by ten different donors or the Zambezi 
which in the same year was financed by five different donors (EUWI 2013). While this 
can be observed as a signal of importance (i.e. international attention) to these basins, it 
can also come with difficulties linked to donor coordination.  
 Other basins have enjoyed insignificant or no support. Generally, in the African continent, 
in 2011 only 21 out of the 59 transboundary basins have enjoyed substantial 
development financing (EUWI, 2013), thus leaving most basins in the region without 
external financial support.   
 
International financial institutions (IFIs)  
A specific type of development cooperation is the support by IFIs – primarily in the form of 
multilateral development banks (MDBs) like the World Bank, which also comprise of regional 
development banks in beneficiary countries. (GWI, 2017; DFID, 2015; World Bank, 2019a) 
IFIs may fund projects through long-term loans at market rates, very long-term loans (i.e. credits) 
below market rates, and through grants – based on the recipient country’s development level. 
(PIDG Business Case, 2015; RIPA Business Case, 2012; UNECE, 2018) 
 In the field of transboundary waters, examples include the World Bank’s projects in the 
Mekong River Basin with the Mekong Integrated Water Resources Management Project 
(World Bank, 2019b), in the Lake Victoria Basin with the Lake Victoria Environmental 
Management Program (GEF, 2019) and in the Volta Basin with the Volta River Basin 
Strategic Action Programme Implementation (World Bank, 2019c).  
At times, IFIs such as the World Bank also manage trust funds that bundle funds from various 
donors (often bilateral ones) for a region and/or sector. Major examples include: 
 World Bank’s Cooperation in International Waters in Africa (CIWA) program, that 
aims to support governments in shared basins in Africa to cooperatively manage their 
water resources for sustainable and climate-resilient growth (CIWA, 2018),  
 World Bank’s South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI), which supports water resources 
management at the basin level (World Bank, 2019d), and 
 World Bank’s Central Asia Energy Water Development Program, that tackles basin-level 
challenges relating to transboundary water and energy issues (World Bank, 2019e).  
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is a special mechanism for supporting (among other 
topics) cooperation over shared water resources. With the help of its implementing agencies, it 
supports countries or entire basins and their countries in the development and implementation of 
transboundary water management. (GEF, 2015) 
 Basins supported by GEF, include the Bug and Neman Basins (and the underlying 
aquifer system), the Danube River Basin, the La Plata Basin, the Nile River Basin as 
well as the Pungwe, Buzi and Sabi River Basins (GEF, 2018). As GEF is also an 
applying mechanism for financial dimensions of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and manages several climate funds, it is 
(partially) also a climate finance mechanism (which will be discussed in the next sub-
section).   
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IFIs can also leverage private funding into TBW projects, e.g. by boosting the attractiveness of 
investments to private investors with improved risk management (e.g. through institutional 
investment guarantee and risk management frameworks like what is provided by the World 
Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)). These financing schemes are usually 
applied for large projects, particularly in the hydropower sector.  (World Bank, 2019f) 
Domestic financial resources  
Financing transboundary water management through financial resources emanating from the 
basin itself can ensuring ownership of the cooperation process. Within the realm of domestic 
financing, this can be differentiated between public and private financing. 
Domestic private financing (mainly infrastructure) 
It is, however, important to note that domestic private investments are typically focused on 
investments within a specific country – even in transboundary basins. There are only a few 
examples of investments crossing borders and targeting infrastructure schemes of transboundary 
scope.  
 They include the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), through which South 
African investments (secured by the World Bank and other international support) 
helped build an infrastructure scheme in Lesotho that eventually benefitted both 
countries. (GWH, 2017a) 
 However, attracting private funding is particularly difficult in cases with lots of 
practical operational challenges and projects with high political risks (such as where 
large TBW infrastructures are involved). Guarantees provided by development banks 
and well-functioning basin institutions can reduce such (perceived) risks. The private 
sector has little appetite for residual political risks – these will often ultimately have to be 
borne by the taxpayer. However, since the history of finance is one of innovation, this can 
change – though not all financial innovation has turned out beneficial. (GWH, 2017a) 
 It is worth to specifically mention green bonds (sometimes also referred to as blue or 
climate bonds). These bonds aim to mobilize private capital resources (at the domestic 
– but also at the international level) for specific projects, including water management 
(potentially also at the transboundary level).  
A key challenge for generating private financing is the lack of bankable projects. Private 
financiers require bankable projects in which they can invest based on a risk assessment that 
relies on information on the risks related to the investment and the expected return on 
investment. Such information is often lacking – specifically in the transboundary water 
development context – thus further impeding private investment opportunities. (World bank, 
2019a) 
 Project preparation facilities have tried to overcome these challenges by pooling 
project preparation in a more efficient manner and enhancing individual actors’ capacity 
in preparing projects. Examples include: 
o SADC Infrastructure Project Preparation and Development Facility (IPPDF), 
hosted by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA),  
o Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)’s Project Preparation Facility and  
o African Water Facility (AWF).  
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Another way to overcome challenges relating to private investments can be blended financing. 
Blended financing is a mechanism that uses public (and often international development) finance 
to mobilize additional private finance in order to scale up overall financial flows into the water 
sector. The inclusion of public resources helps to improve the risk-return profile of investments 
that are otherwise not attractive to private financiers due to the high risks associated with them. 
(World Bank, 2019a; ODI, 2018; BFT, 2018) 
Especially for transboundary water management, where risks are high and returns on investment 
not always immediately visible, such blended finance could be an important vehicle to overcome 
investment shortages. So far, practical experience with the use of blended financing for 
transboundary water management are, however, limited. If at all, they relate to the development 
of infrastructure. In addition, international development banks such as the World Bank are 
increasingly developing guarantee mechanisms for facilitating private investments, also reflecting 
the increasing acknowledgement that due to the specific nature of the water sector a combination 
of public and private financing is required. (UNECE, 2018) 
Domestic public financing  
One can differentiate between public financial resources that originate from a government’s 
general budget (raised through taxes and other mechanisms of government income) and 
financial resources originating out of specific funding mechanisms for the water sector (such as 
fees and charges directly relating to water use, water pollution, etc.). In any case, strong legal, 
institutional and procedural linkages between basin level cooperation processes and national or 
even sub-national planning, management and budgeting processes are required. In addition to 
the question of the origin of public financing, it is also important to note the different ways to 
allocate or share such financial responsibilities in the transboundary context: Basin 
organizations, for instance, are typically financed by their respective member states, which 
happens through different mechanisms. In relation to this, UNECE (2018) notes that: 
 Financing can thereby occur both through direct financial contributions (membership 
contributions) or through in-kind contributions (member states, for instance, providing the 
building and premises for a basin organization’s secretariat – such as South Africa in the 
case of Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM).  
 Financial contributions in the form of membership contributions are typically borne out of 
a state’s direct budget. There are, however, exceptions: International Commission of the 
Congo-Oubangui-Sangha Basin (CICOS), for instance, is financed partly through a 
regional organization, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), 
which contributes parts of its income generated through its import tariffs to CICOS for 
those CICOS member states that are CEMAC members.  
 Financial contributions can be shared by member states in an equal manner or based on 
a specific cost-sharing mechanism (or a combination of the two). Such mechanisms are 
typically based on specific indicators (e.g. the share of a country in the basin) or a set of 
such indicators (e.g. in the case of the Mekong River Commission, where annual budget 
increases are shared based on a formula that consists of the share of a state in the 
basin’s territory, its average flow contribution, its irrigated area, its population and its per 
capita GDP).  
 Often, these sharing mechanisms change over time. The ICPDR, for example, moved 
towards equal cost-sharing as downstream riparians developed economically, and the 
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Mekong River Commission is currently revising its cost-sharing mechanism in the context 
of its overall organizational reform, aiming at establishing an equal cost-sharing principle.  
 In addition to membership contributions – whether in-kind or through financial means – 
some basin organizations have tried to explore alternative financing mechanisms such as 
basin funds, funds for specific purposes or business activities such as providing services 
against certain fees, etc. ORASECOM, for instance, has explored opportunities for 
establishing an ORASECOM Conservation Fund that would acquire and provide 
financing for specific conservation projects in the basin that have been identified through 
the basin management cycle that is based on a thorough assessment of the state of the 
basin and the challenges it faces. The fund would be its own legal entity under 
ORASECOM’s management (with the involvement of member countries, donors and 
other stakeholders) and qualify as a charitable company under South African 
(ORASECOM’s seat) company law (ORASECOM, 2009). Despite significant interest in 
this innovative mechanism, it was never set up for several administrative and legal 
reasons.  
 Similarly, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) has discussed establishing a fund fed by 
hydropower charges (of 0.1% of hydropower incomes from mainstream projects) that 
would fund environmental protection and management measures in the basin, which, 
however, also never materialized due to the different interests of individual MRC member 
states.  
 Another type of alternative income can be found in the hydropower charges collected by 
the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) from the operation of Kariba Dam and the distribution 
of electricity, although constituting a specific case as the ZRA is not a typical basin 
organization, but rather a transboundary infrastructure operator owned jointly by two 
countries. 
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